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The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders
Compete for Flows
AMIL DASGUPTA and GIORGIA PIACENTINO∗
ABSTRACT
Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate gover-
nance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of block sale (“exit”)
can be an effective governance mechanism. Many blockholders are money managers.
We show that when money managers compete for investor capital, the threat of exit
loses credibility, weakening its governance role. Money managers with more skin in
the game will govern more successfully using exit. Allowing funds to engage in ac-
tivist measures (“voice”) does not alter our qualitative results. Our results link widely
prevalent incentives in the ever-expanding money management industry to the nature
of corporate governance.
Equity blockholders in publicly traded corporations who are dissatisfied with the actions of
company management can sell their blocks—the so-called “Wall Street Walk.” A growing
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theoretical literature starting with Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009) argues
that the Wall Street Walk can be an effective form of governance. The exit of a blockholder
will typically depress the stock price, punishing management whenever executive compen-
sation is linked to the market price of equity. Thus, faced with a credible threat of exit,
management will be reluctant to underperform. Admati and Pfleiderer argue that when
blockholders observe managers underperforming, it is in their own interest to exit early be-
fore information about the manager’s underperformance becomes public. This makes exit a
credible threat that ameliorates managerial underperformance and enhances firm value. Ed-
mans argues that informed institutional trading enhances the informational efficiency of the
firm’s equity in the secondary market, enabling myopic managers to make better investment
decisions.
The theoretical literature on exit treats the blockholder as a profit-maximizing principal:
she acts as an individual owner of an equity block would. In contrast, a significant proportion
of equity blocks is held by delegated portfolio managers who manage money for others (for
example, mutual funds, and hedge funds).1 This matters because money managers often
face short-term incentives that may lead them to behave in ways that are not conducive to
good corporate governance. For example, as the EU (2011) Corporate Governance Green
Paper notes,
It appears that the way asset managers’ performance is evaluated... encourages
asset managers to seek short-term benefits... The Commission believes that short-
term incentives... may contribute significantly to asset managers’ short-termism,
which probably has an impact on shareholder apathy.
An important reason why money managers may not take a long-term view is that their
investors chase short-term performance, which generates well-documented short-term flow-
performance relationships.2 In this paper we build on Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) to
study how the presence of (endogenous) short-term flow-performance relationships affects
the ability of delegated blockholders to govern via the threat of exit. Our key observation
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manager’s skill and thus affect investor flows. We show that this signalling role of exit impairs
its disciplinary potential. The perverse effect of flow-performance relationships operates
through both linear assets under management (AUM) fees and convex performance fees
(carried interest or “carry”)—the two components of standard “two and twenty” contracts.
Thus, common contractual arrangements in money management foster endogenous short-
termism and impair the effectiveness of exit. We show that offsetting, long-term incentives
arise from the degree to which the fund manager self-invests in her fund: whether a money
manager can successfully govern via the threat of exit depends on the degree to which she
has skin in the game.
We analyze a three-date model with many funds, investors, and firms. Each fund uses a
combination of investor capital and proprietary resources (self-investment) to hold a block
in a firm. Funds are compensated via a combination of AUM fees and carried interest. At
the initial date, each firm manager takes actions that affect firm performance. Each fund
can observe whether the manager of the company in which she owns a block underperforms
and may then sell the block at the interim date before the market learns about managerial
actions. At the final date, uncertainty resolves and consumption occurs.
Funds differ in their ability as stock pickers. Funds that are good stock pickers are
more likely to invest in companies with better corporate governance. In such companies,
management is less likely to underperform, making blockholder exit less likely to be necessary.
Investors observe the returns generated by all funds at the interim date, make inferences
about stock picking ability, and allocate their money accordingly. The inferences about
funds’ stock picking ability are relevant because, following the interim date, funds have access
to further investment opportunities, the quality of which are again determined by their stock
picking skills: good stock pickers have access to better opportunities. Accordingly, investors
rationally use the interim performance of funds to make capital allocation decisions.
Suppose that a fund—after acquiring a block in a company—observes that management
is underperforming. The fund can either sell her block in the underperforming company at
the interim date (that is, exit) or wait until the final date. If she sells early, she may be able
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reduction in value implied by management underperformance. If she waits and sells later,
she will liquidate her block at a lower price. Thus, to the extent that the fund cares directly
about her portfolio value due to her self-investment, she will be inclined to exit.
However, the fund may also be concerned about inferences made in the short term by
investors, which may affect her payoffs via endogenous flows. If she sells the block early,
she will hurt her short-term return relative to other funds, causing an earlier loss of investor
flow. In contrast, if she does not sell her block early but some other funds do, her short-term
return relative to others will be improved—she will not only keep her own investors, but may
also attract investors from other funds (who may have sold their underpeforming blocks early
and thus underperformed). Of course, there will be a price to pay later in terms of lowered
liquidation value. In the meanwhile, however, the fund will earn AUM fees by retaining her
own investors and attracting new ones. Selling the block early also reduces carried interest:
not only will a sale reduce current carry by lowering today’s marked-to-market portfolio
value, but, due to endogenous outflows, it will also reduce fund size, and thereby limit access
to new investments and reduce future carry. Thus, given flow-performance relationships, the
presence of AUM fees and carried interest discourages funds from exiting.
Our main result (Proposition 2) formalizes this trade-off. We show that when delegated
blockholders do not have sufficient self-investment, and when good and bad funds are suffi-
ciently different (so that investors chase performance), the threat of exit cannot be credible
in equilibrium. The applied implication of our result is that funds’ ability to govern via exit
will be determined by the relative strength of contractual incentives and self-investment. For
a given compensation contract, we also show (Proposition 5) that there is always a level of
self-investment high enough to induce the fund to behave identically to Admati and Pflei-
derer’s (2009) principal blockholder even when faced with flow-performance relationships.
We couch our applied discussion in terms of two prominent classes of money managers:
mutual funds and hedge funds.
Mutual funds are distinctive in that, for regulatory reasons, they do not charge carried
interest. Further, mutual fund managers invest very little in their funds: according to
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among those that do, average self-investment is 0.04% of AUM. Proposition 2 applies directly
to mutual funds with no self-investment at all. Further, simple calculations based on our
model show that self-investment on the order of 10−4 of AUM is insufficient to overcome
flow-based disincentives to exit.
Hedge funds differ from mutual funds in that they charge both AUM fees and carried
interest but, as general partners in limited partnerships, their managers invest significantly
in their own funds. Building on the characterization in Proposition 5, our calculations show
that for reasonable ranges of parameters, hedge funds with self-investment of around 10%
of AUM—a number consistent with the literature—will successfully govern via the threat of
exit, which is in line with evidence in Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013).
In sum, with respect to the efficacy of exit as a governance mechanism, our analysis offers
a reassuring view of hedge funds but raises concerns about mutual funds. Such concerns must,
of course, be interpreted in the context of the limits of our stylized game-theoretic model.
To examine the robustness of our negative result on mutual funds, we discuss a number of
variations of the model. The key driver of perverse incentives in our model is short-term
performance evaluation by investors. We find that introducing uncertainty over short-term
performance evaluation improves behavior: mutual funds that may not be evaluated by all of
their investors in the interim period will be better incentivized to exit (Proposition 3). Our
negative results are thus most salient when the evaluation horizon is short relative to the
resolution of uncertainty about firm value. Holding fixed short-term evaluation, we also ask
whether the presence of long-term evaluation affects our results. Long-term evaluation may
improve incentives to exit when fund portfolios are opaque and feature multiple investments:
funds may be able to camouflage losses from exiting an underperforming block by better
performances in other investments. Mutual funds face reporting requirements that reveal
detailed portfolio holdings to investors at quarterly frequencies. Such disclosure requirements
may have the undesirable side effect of making mutual funds less effective in using exit
to govern. Finally, while stock selection is a natural way to model skill for mutual fund
managers, for theoretical completeness we examine whether a different definition of ability
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to observe managerial underperformance at the interim date. We find that competition for
flow still has a negative effect on mutual fund behavior: instead of exiting too little, mutual
funds now exit too much. While this changes our specific empirical prediction, it does not
alter our economic message: excessive exit also reduces discipline, and thus competition for
flow again reduces the effectiveness of exit when used by mutual fund blockholders.
The growing empirical literature on exit as a governance mechanism3 has not, to date,
focussed on the impact of blockholder compensation. The literature nevertheless provides
findings that may be interpreted through the lens of our model. Parrino, Sias, and Starks
(2003) are the first to empirically investigate the role of exit as a governance mechanism.
They show that the degree to which institutions use exit may depend on their type. Using
the CDA/Spectrum classification of institutions (into Bank Trusts, Insurance Companies,
Independent Investment Advisors, Investment Companies, and Others), they find that, over
the 1982 to 1993 period, investment companies used exit less than bank trusts. While the
legal nature of the CDA/Spectrum classification is hard to interpret, a mutual fund typically
appears as an investment company under this classification. Parrino, Sias, and Starks’s
finding is then broadly consistent with our model: mutual funds are likely to face more
performance-chasing by clients and have lower proprietary ownership than bank trusts.4
In contrast to the empirical literature on exit, a growing literature establishes variation in
the degrees to which different types of institutional investors use other governance tools such
as behind-the-scenes engagement with management, jawboning, etc.—collectively referred to
as “voice”—to discipline management and deliver shareholder value. A number of empirical
papers show that hedge funds produce substantial gains to shareholders of target companies
by using voice (see, for example, Brav et al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), and Becht,
Franks, and Grant (2010). In contrast, mutual funds do not appear to use voice to a similar
degree. For example, Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that mutual funds do not typically
sponsor shareholder proposals, do not uniformly use proxy voting to improve corporate
governance, and do not even make significant demands of management during behind-the-
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and Starks (2007), who list the roles of different institutional investors in using voice since
the 1930s.
Our results linking blockholder incentives with the effectiveness of exit may provide a
basis for interpreting the empirical evidence on institutional voice. The link arises from the
fact that shareholder voice is usually not legally binding on the company’s management. As
a result, it is sometimes argued that the threat of exit supports shareholders’ voice. This
idea dates back at least to Hirschman (1970, p. 82), who writes that “The chances for voice
to function effectively...are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up by the threat of
exit.”
Motivated by Hirschman’s complementarity hypothesis, we extend our model to incorpo-
rate active monitoring and ask whether exit and voice can be complementary to each other.
We allow blockholding funds to use voice if they realize that their portfolio firm cannot be
disciplined via the threat of exit alone. Voice takes the form of costly proposals for changes
in business strategy that increase managers’ incentives to make better choices. We show
that there exists a class of firms for which exit and voice are complementary: managers heed
blockholder voice if and only if it is backed up by a credible threat of exit if voice is ignored
(Proposition 6). For such firms, only those funds that can credibly threaten to exit will use
voice. Thus, our results provide one way to interpret the empirical regularity that mutual
funds are less vocal than hedge funds.5
At a theoretical level, our analysis relates most directly to the relatively recent literature
that shows the threat of exit is, in and of itself, a governance mechanism. In addition
to Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009), this literature includes Edmans and
Manso (2011), who consider the trade-off between voice and exit and solve for the number of
blockholders that maximizes firm value. In recent work, Levit (2014) shows that voice and
exit can be complementary because the option to exit enhances the efficacy of communication
between the informed blockholder and the firm’s manager. In contrast to these papers, which
treat the blockholder as a principal, we focus on the delegated nature of blockholding. This
new literature on exit, as well as our work, builds on a large theoretical literature on the role of
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and focuses on their incentives to monitor. While some papers within that literature consider
the trade-off between voice and exit (for example, Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998),
Mello and Repullo (2004)), they do not focus on exit as a governance mechanism. Like us,
Goldman and Strobl (2013) study the impact of fund managers’ incentives on blockholder
monitoring, but in contrast to us, they take fund managers’ short-termism as given and
examine its impact on firm investment policy.
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the financial equilibrium implica-
tions of funds’ career concerns (for example, Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and
Verardo (2011), and Guerrieri and Kondor (2012)). These papers establish a link between
fund managers’ flow motivations and the equilibrium prices, returns, and volume of assets
they trade. In contrast, we focus on the implications of funds’ flow motivations on the nature
of corporate governance in firms in which they hold equity blocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we introduce the governance
problem. Section II reviews Admati and Pfleiderer’s (2009) result on exit as a governance
mechanism when the blockholder is a principal. In Section III we enrich the analysis by
introducing delegated blockholding. Section IV presents our central result, while Sections V
and VI examine its applied implications. In Section VII we extend our model to incorporate
active monitoring. Section VIII concludes.
I. The Governance Problem
We consider a unit-measure continuum of publicly traded all-equity-financed firms. Some
of these firms are characterized by an agency problem as described below. We ask how
changes in the ownership structure—the presence of blockholders of different types—can
influence the nature of corporate governance in the firm. The underlying model of the firm
facing agency problems is a slight variation of that of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009).7
There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2). Each firm is run by a manager. A measure A ∈ (0, 1)
of firms is characterized by a moral hazard problem. In each of these firms, at t = 0 the
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at t = 2 is vH > 0. If he chooses a = 1, the value of the firm is vL = vH − ∆v for some
∆v ∈ (0, vH). Thus a = 1 is undesirable and, following Admati and Pfleiderer, we refer to it
as the “perverse action.” The manager is tempted to choose a = 1 because, by doing so, he
receives a stochastic private benefit β˜ ∼ F , where F is strictly increasing and differentiable
on [0, β¯], and β˜ is privately observed by the manager and never revealed to others. All cash
flows of the firm become public at t = 2 when consumption occurs.
We assume, following Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), that each manager’s contractual
payoff depends on his firm’s market prices at t = 1 and t = 2. Denoting by P1 and P2 the
market price of a given firm at t = 1 and t = 2, respectively, the manager’s payoff when
he takes action 0 is ω1P1 + ω2P2, where ω1 > 0 and ω2 > 0 represent the sensitivities of
managerial compensation to the short- and long-term market values. If the manager instead
takes action 1, his payoff is ω1P1 + ω2P2 + β, where β ≥ 0 is the realized value of β˜.
Prices P1 and P2 for any given firm are set by a risk-neutral market maker on the basis
of all available public information. In addition to firms’ equity, the economy also includes
an index asset, which represents a broad benchmark. We assume this asset is in infinitely
elastic supply and normalize its gross return to unity.
The complementary set of firms of measure 1−A, while identical to the firms described
above in all other ways, is free of agency problems. That is, in each such firm the manager
has a degenerate action space: a ∈ {0}. Thus, each such firm is worth vH .
Each firm is owned by many small, passive direct shareholders as well as a large block-
holder. The identity of the blockholder will change across different variants of our model.
In the initial baseline case, which is essentially identical to Admati and Pfleiderer’s (2009)
setup8, the blockholder is a principal and we think of her as a large private blockholding
investor. In the core of our paper, motivated by the significant degree of blockholding by
institutional asset managers in Anglo-Saxon financial systems, we instead model the block-
holder as a fund who acts on behalf of a continuum of identical investors.
In all variants of our model, the blockholder is initially unaware of whether her firm is
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of her firm at t = 0 and is able to sell her stake in the firm at t = 1 in response. Because the
blockholder’s potential sales are based on her observation of the manager’s action, which in
turn affects firm value, the price at the interim date (t = 1) will be affected by the trading
decision of the blockholder. This, in turn, will affect the payoffs of the manager, generating
the core corporate governance mechanism. If the blockholder can credibly threaten to exit
when the manager takes action 1, thus lowering the firm’s traded price at t = 1, the resulting
reduction in the manager’s payoff can induce him to take the perverse action less often, thus
reducing the agency costs and increasing the value of the firm.
It is useful at the outset to outline the incidence of the perverse action (in a firm with
agency problems) in the absence of a blockholder. In such a setting, since small sharehold-
ers are passive (implicitly, they have neither the skill nor the incentive to acquire private
information about the manager’s actions), the price of the firm at t = 1 is insensitive to the
manager’s actions. Accordingly, the manager compares his rent from taking the perverse
action β + ω1P1 + ω2vL with that of taking the non-perverse action ω1P1 + ω2vH. He thus
takes the perverse action if and only if β ≥ ω2∆v =: βNo-L. To rule out the trivial case in
which agency problems never matter, we assume throughout that β¯ > ω2∆v.
In what follows, we consider whether the presence of different types of blockholders
can reduce the incidence of the manager’s perverse action. We begin with the important
benchmark case in which the blockholder acts as a principal.
II. The Blockholder as Principal: Governance via Exit
In Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), the blockholder is a principal and cares only about the
liquidation value of her position. She may, however, face a liquidity shock at t = 1 with
probability θ ∈ (0, 1) that forces her to immediately liquidate her position. The market
maker does not observe the liquidity shock. We can now state and prove our (minor) variant
of Admati and Pfleiderer’s result here.
PROPOSITION 1: (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)) In the unique equilibrium, the block-
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βL ∈ (βNo−L,∞) such that, unless the firm is free of agency problems, the manager chooses
a = 1 if and only if β ≥ βL.
This and all other proofs are in Appendix A. The intuition is as follows. When the
blockholder observes that the manager has chosen a = 1, she realizes that at t = 2, when
information becomes public the firm’s value will be vL. If she has not been hit by the
liquidity shock she can choose between holding her block until t = 2, in which case she
gets vL, or selling at t = 1. Of course, selling at t = 1 will lower the price of the block,
because her trade may reflect private information. However, because the market maker
assigns positive probability to the sale being induced by the blockholder’s liquidity shock,
the loss in value from the early sale will be smaller than the loss from holding until t = 2.
Thus, the blockholder will exit at t = 1, lowering P1. Knowing this, the manager will hesitate
to take the perverse action: the blockholder’s action reduces the payoff to the manager from
choosing a = 1 via a lower interim price P1, which makes him relatively reluctant to do so.
The equilibrium therefore is characterized by a cutoff βL such that the manager takes the
perverse action if and only if β ≥ βL, where βL > βNo-L. The increase in the threshold for
taking the perverse action from βNo-L to βL embodies the disciplining role of the threat of
exit. We now turn to the case in which the blockholder is not a principal, but rather is an
agent.
III. The Blockholder As Agent: A Model
We now consider the case in which the blockholder is a delegated portfolio manager. We
refer to such a blockholder as a fund (F) and assume that there is a continuum of funds
of equal measure to that of firms. Funds and their investors are essential to each other:
investors without fund managers and fund managers without money to manage can only
invest in the index asset.9 For simplicity, we do not allow investors or funds to lever up.
Each fund enters the model holding a block in one firm.
The initial financing of the block derives from two sources. A fraction α ∈ [0, 1) is
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game.” The remainder is financed by a continuum of identical small investors of measure
1− α. A distinct continuum of small investors finances each fund. A manager’s skin in the
game or any investment proceeds from it cannot be moved to a different fund. We do not
model the sources of self-investment but examine its consequences. We argue below that
there is considerable variation in the observed levels of self-investment across different types
of funds. Thus, we treat α as a parameter that captures a relevant source of cross-sectional
variation.
A blockholding fund, like the principal blockholder of the previous section, can observe
the actions of the firm’s manager at t = 0, and can choose whether to exit at t = 1 or to
hold until t = 2. To match the liquidity shock of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), we assume
each fund is hit by a liquidity shock at t = 1 with probability θ ∈ (0, 1) that forces her to
liquidate at t = 1 and shut down after returning the value of liquidated funds to investors
and consuming any fees (specified below) payable at t = 1. The fund’s liquidity shock is
not observed by the market maker. Shocks are i.i.d. across funds. Thus, as in Admati and
Pfleiderer (2009), θ is a proxy for secondary market liquidity.
As discussed in the introduction, an important strand of the empirical literature docu-
ments that investors chase performance across funds of different ability, generating funds’
competition for investor flow. In order to incorporate concerns for flow, we augment the
model by adding two ingredients.
First, we assume a degree of heterogeneity across funds, which affects their relative desir-
ability as agents from the perspective of investors. Blockholding funds differ in their stock
picking ability; this affects both their ability to select firms in which to hold blocks at t = 0
and their access to new investments at t = 1. There are two types of funds: good (τF = G)
and bad (τF = B), where Pr(τF = G) = γF. As is standard in experts models, we assume
that funds do not know their own type. Blocks held by good funds are free of agency prob-
lems with probability γGM ≤ 1, while those held by bad funds are free of agency problems
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At t = 1 funds with money to manage have access to new investment opportunities. A
fund with τF = G can generate gross returns RG > 1 at t = 2 for each dollar invested
between t = 1 and t = 2. In contrast, a fund with τF = B can generate gross returns RB < 1
at t = 2 for each dollar invested between t = 1 and t = 2.
Second, we introduce a hiring and replacement process between investors and funds. Each
investor at t = 0 is matched to a fund who holds a block on his behalf. He does not know the
type of the fund that he is matched to. At t = 1 he can update his inference about the fund’s
type by observing the value of the fund’s portfolio. The investor also observes the portfolio
values of all other funds and can make all relevant inferences. After such observation, the
investor may either retain or fire his fund. The investor who fires his fund may then invest
in one or more alternative funds or invest directly in the index asset.
To conclude the model description, we describe the payoffs to investors and funds. The
payoffs to fund investors are as follows. Consider an investor who invests it at date t in a
fund, and let It be the total investment in that fund at date t. That investor is entitled
to a date t + 1 payoff of it
It
Vt+1, where Vt+1 represents the date t + 1 market value of the
investment It. New and old investors are treated symmetrically.
10
Investors also pay fees to their funds. We model fees in the form of “two and twenty”
contracts involving AUM fees, given by a fraction w ∈ [0, 1) of committed capital, and carried
interest, given by a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1) of any positive investment profits generated between t
and t+ 1. In particular, a fund receiving a total investment of It at date t receives an AUM
fee of wIt at t and also a carry of φ [Vt+1 − It]+ at t+ 1, where [x]+ := max {x, 0}.
Each investor pays fees in proportion to his investment in the fund. If at date t he
invests it in a fund that receives a total date t investment of It, at t he pays wit and at
t + 1 he pays a fraction it
It
of the total carried interest paid to the fund at date t + 1. All
statements made about fees here apply to all investments in the fund including the fund’s
self-investment. Thus, effectively, the fund pays fees to herself on her proprietary investment,
though of course these fees net out of the fund’s payout and do not affect her incentives. For
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what follows, we typically use Θ to denote the full set of model parameters. For any subset
S ⊂ Θ, we use Θ\S to denote the set of parameters excluding those in S.
IV. The Failure of Governance via Exit
Is it feasible for delegated blockholders to credibly threaten managers with exit condi-
tional on a perverse action being taken? We find the following result.
PROPOSITION 2: For RG and γ
G
M sufficiently large and for any w ∈ [0, 1) and φ ∈ [0, 1),
there exists α¯ (Θ, w, φ) ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α < α¯ (Θ, w, φ) it cannot be an equilibrium
for any fund to choose to sell if and only if a = 1.
The formal argument, which is detailed in Appendix A, proceeds as follows. We first
establish conditions under which, if a fund adopts a strategy of selling the block at t = 1 if
and only if she observes that the manager has taken the perverse action, then that fund’s
investors choose to retain her services at t = 1 if and only if the fund has not sold at t = 1.
We then establish conditions under which such a retention strategy on the part of investors
induces the fund not to sell at t = 1 even if she has observed the manager taking the perverse
action. This establishes a set of conditions under which it is impossible for the fund to sell
(in equilibrium) at t = 1 if and only if she observes the perverse action.
Our result characterizes conditions under which the threat of exit cannot be credibly
used in equilibrium. A key condition is that α is not too large. The parameter α represents
a fund manager’s self-investment (or skin in the game) as a fraction of initial AUM. Admati
and Pfleiderer’s (2009) principal blockholder can be represented by α = 1 (and w = φ = 0).
In their model, the blockholder exits in equilibrium. In ours, for α < α¯ exit cannot arise
in equilibrium. Since α¯ < 1, our result does not contradict theirs. Indeed, we show later
(Proposition 5) that for sufficiently large α it is an equilibrium for funds to exit when the
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Professional money managers typically run funds that are much larger than their personal
stakes. This makes the small-α case of significant interest. For small α, how does the presence
of incentives embedded in w > 0 and φ > 0 affect the fund’s ability to exit?
The incentives of funds must be understood in the context of investor behavior. Under the
conditions of Proposition 2, investors rationally chase performance. When γGM is sufficiently
high, good funds are sufficiently likely to invest in companies with no agency problems.
When an investor infers upon observing the high marked-to-market value of their fund’s
t = 1 portfolio that his fund has not exited (which implies, given the fund’s proposed
strategy, that a = 0), he infers that his fund is likely to be good. Since RG is high, it is in
his best interest to remain invested in his fund. Instead, when an investor infers from the
observation of a low portfolio value at t = 1 that his fund has chosen to exit (i.e., a = 1), he
realizes that his fund is sufficiently likely to be bad. Given that RB < 1, if such a fund were
to undertake further investments at t = 1, these would generate a lower expected return
than the index asset, so that the investor would prefer to directly invest in the index asset.11
If, on the other hand, the fund were to invest in the index asset at t = 1, the investor who
retains the fund would be paying fees for investments he could undertake himself. Thus, in
either case, the investor withdraws his capital from a fund that exits, and reallocates his
capital to one or more funds that do not exit.12
Earning a fraction of AUM (w > 0) creates an incentive for funds to maximize their size.
If investors chase performance, funds will compete for flow, because each dollar of additional
money to manage earns them an additional fee of w. As discussed above, funds that exit lose
flow because they are fired by their initial clients and do not receive any inflow from other
investors at t = 1. In contrast, funds that do not exit not only retain their initial clients
but also receive additional inflow from the original clients of funds that have exited. Thus,
earning AUM fees makes it less attractive for the fund to exit, ceteris paribus.
Earning a carry (φ > 0) also discourages funds from exiting. Not selling the block when
the firm’s management has taken the perverse action allows the fund to (temporarily) enjoy
a higher portfolio value, which results in a higher t = 1 carry. Of course, the actions of the
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on the block position if retained. However, since the carry only applies to the positive part
of profits, such future losses are not costly from the perspective of the carry. Denoting by P0,
P ns1 , and P
s
1 the initial price of the block and its interim price conditional on no sale and on
sale at t = 1, respectively, we show in the proof of Proposition 2 that P ns1 > P0 > P
s
1 > vL.
Thus, exiting at t = 1 earns a fund an immediate carry of φ [P s1 − P0]+ = 0, after which it
no longer has money to manage and thus there is no further carry to be earned. Not exiting
at t = 1 earns the fund an immediate carry of φ [P ns1 − P0]+ > 0. In addition, future carry
may also be nonnegative: by not exiting, the fund earns inflow and may choose to invest in
new investment opportunities at t = 1 despite the fact that they have negative expected net
returns, because the carry allows her to enjoy the upside only.
The argument above also demonstrates that there is a subtle interaction between the
effect of competition for flow and the carry on the funds’ incentives: exit is costly from
the point of view of a fund’s carry because exiting funds do not earn either a current carry
(because P s1 < P0) or a future carry (since they lose their investors as a result of outflows).
In the (counterfactual) absence of any flow-performance relationship, the disincentive to exit
due to carry would be reduced. For example, if γGM = γ
B
M, so that exit is uninformative about
ability, then investors would (rationally) not make negative inferences from exit by their
fund at t = 1. In that case, funds that observe a = 1 can still be retained in equilibrium
if they exit and (rationally) choose to invest in new investment opportunities and thus earn
future carry upon exiting. Thus, exit is less costly to carry without competition for flow
than with. In other words, competition for flow and carry incentives complement each other
in reducing a fund’s incentive to exit.
Countervailing incentives stem from the fund’s self-investment α. A fund who observes
a = 1 faces a choice between two options. She may hold the block, be retained by current
investors and receive inflow from new investors, and earn a positive current carry, but suffer
from having to liquidate the block at a lower price at t = 2, which lowers the value of her
self-investment. Further, any attempt by this fund to enhance future carry by investing
available capital in new opportunities at t = 1 will also be costly to self-investment, because
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observing a = 1. Alternatively, the fund may sell the block early, be fired by her investor
and lose AUM fees in the second period, and earn zero (current and future) carry, but obtain
a higher return on her self-invested capital because of a higher block liquidation price. How
the fund behaves depends on the relative sizes of w, φ, and α. For any given w and φ, if α
is small, the option not to exit is more attractive. This destroys the equilibrium incentives
of funds to exit underperforming blocks.13
There is considerable variation in the types of money management vehicles available to
investors. At one end of the spectrum are regulated retail vehicles such as mutual funds. At
the other are (relatively) unregulated and nimble institutions such as hedge funds. What
unites the two ends of the spectrum in the context of our model are flow performance
relationships. A wealth of evidence shows that flow-based rewards for good performance are
experienced by both mutual fund managers (for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996),
Chevalier and Ellison (1997)) and hedge funds managers (for example, Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik (2009), Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2013)). The similarities end there. Two key
differences between mutual funds and hedge funds are of immediate relevance to our model.
First, there is a significant difference in the fee structure of mutual funds and hedge funds:
hedge funds charge a carry to their investors (typically around 20%) while mutual funds
do not. Second, it is well known that mutual funds typically feature less managerial self-
investment than hedge funds. Since competition for flow, the carry (φ), and self-investment
(α) are all key interrelated driving features of Proposition 2, our model may have implications
for the degree to which mutual funds and hedge funds can govern via the threat of exit. Other
differences between mutual funds and hedge funds, for example, differences in the incidence
of lock up provisions or differences in opacity, may also be indirectly relevant to our analysis.
Thus, to explore the applied implications of our findings, in the next part of our analysis we
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V. Mutual Funds
The 1970 amendment to the Investment Companies Act of 1940 prohibits mutual funds
from charging asymmetric performance fees. As a result, mutual funds almost universally
charge only flat AUM fees (Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003)). In the context of our model,
therefore, mutual funds are motivated purely by a combination of their AUM fee, w > 0,
and managerial self-investment, α ≥ 0, if any. The former gives rise to flow motivations,
while the latter endows direct profit motivations. The relative size of w versus α determines
the relative degree of flow motivation. Proposition 2 implies that those mutual funds that
have little managerial self-investment, that is, those that are principally flow motivated, will
not be able to credibly threaten to exit in equilibrium.
The available evidence suggests that mutual fund managers have limited self-investment.
For example, Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) document that 57% of mutual fund
managers have no self-investment, and thus are purely flow motivated. In the Khorana,
Servaes, and Wedge (2007) sample, the average managerial self-investment in those funds
that are not purely flow motivated is 0.04%. Increased reporting requirements has given
rise to greater availability of information on mutual fund managers’ self-investment in recent
years, but the degree of self-investment remains very low. For example, according to a 2011
Morningstar report (Kinnel (2011)), even in the style category with the highest managerial
investment—domestic equity funds—47% of funds had zero managerial investment and 88%
of funds had managerial investment of under $1 million. Given the large size of equity mutual
funds, managerial investments of less than $1 million are likely to represent a trivial fraction
of AUM.14
Thus, the data indicate that about half of mutual funds are purely flow motivated (α =
0) and the average mutual fund is principally flow motivated (α ∼ 10−4). Proposition 2
applies immediately to purely flow-motivated mutual funds and suggests that they will not
be effective in using exit as a governance device. For those funds that are not purely flow
motivated, simple calculations based on our model suggest that for α ∼ 10−4, funds will
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noting that our calculations are conservative: in our calculations we fix α = 0.01, two orders
of magnitude larger than the average self-investment of non-purely flow-motivated managers.
Thus, the calculations support our conclusion with significant margin for error to account
for relevant factors that may not feature in the model.
Mutual funds own over 20% of corporate equity in the U.S., hold blocks of nontrivial size
in a majority of large U.S. corporations (Davis and Yoo (2003)), and are the main investment
vehicle for retail investors. The conclusion suggesting that half or more of such funds are
unable to effectively use exit for governance is, therefore, a matter of significant concern. In
the remainder of this section, we dig deeper into our result and the factors driving mutual
fund behavior.
Our characterization of mutual fund behavior is driven by the fact that mutual funds
compete for flow. Our baseline model only considers a (endogenously generated) short-term
flow-performance relationship. To further our understanding, we first examine whether our
finding is robust to the presence of long-term flows.
A. Long-Term Flows
We investigate the effect of long-term versus short-term flows via two complementary
approaches. First, we mute short-term evaluation by introducing investors who do not
evaluate performance at t = 1. Second, we hold fixed the (endogenous) flow-performance
relationship at t = 1 and add a flow-performance relationship at t = 2.
A.1. Reducing Short-Term Flows
It is possible that when the fund has an opportunity to sell an underperforming block, she
realizes that she may not face scrutiny from all of her own investors before uncertainty about
firm value is resolved. How would this affect the relative desirability of exit? To examine
this question in the simplest possible manner we change the investor base of a single fund,
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of a given fund’s investors are inattentive, that is, they do not evaluate the fund at t = 1.
We do not change the nature of the other funds’ investors. We show that as the measure
of inattentive investors increases, exit becomes more attractive to a fund that has observed
a = 1. Since our result is stated for mutual funds, we set φ = 0.
PROPOSITION 3: For RG and γ
G
M sufficiently large and for any w ∈ [0, 1) and ι ∈ [0, 1),
there exists α¯ (Θ, w, ι) ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α < α¯ (Θ, w, ι) it cannot be an equilibrium
for any fund to choose to sell if and only if she observes a = 1. The bound α¯ (Θ, w, ι) is
decreasing in ι.
In other words, for a fund with more inattentive investors, exit fails for a smaller range
of α. The intuition is that, as the measure of inattentive investors increases, the fund faces
a lower threat of a loss of flow due to exit. Ceteris paribus, this increases the incentives
to exit. This result implies that our critique of exit is most relevant when the frequency of
investor evaluation is high relative to the frequency of resolution of uncertainty about the
firm’s value.
A.2. Adding a Long-Term Flow Performance Relationship
We now consider the possibility of simultaneous short-term and long-term evaluation. To
introduce long-term flow we add new investors at t = 2 who can observe the fund’s returns
at t = 1 and t = 2 and hire any surviving fund. If funds follow the strategy of exiting if and
only if they observe a = 1, these investors have the choice of hiring either funds that have
not sold at t = 1 (having observed a = 0) or funds that have voluntarily sold at t = 1 (having
observed a = 1). We are interested in whether the presence of such investors can change
the t = 1 actions of the latter fund, that is, one who has observed a = 1. Consider such
a fund. If the fund exits, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 and informally discussed
above, at t = 1 investors update their beliefs to γ
F
< γF. Of course, now the new investors
will observe the fund’s portfolio value at t = 2. However, such observation does not change
inferences about the fund, since a sale at t = 1 perfectly predicts the portfolio value at t = 2.
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value is vL. Second, upon observing that she had chosen the wrong firm to hold a block in,
the fund rationally downgrades her beliefs about her own ability and, since φ = 0, invests
any funds available to her between t = 1 and t = 2 in the index asset, which provides a
type-independent return. Thus, at t = 2 the posterior attached to any fund that did sell at
t = 1 remains γ
F
< γF. However, the new investors have the option of hiring instead funds
that did not sell at t = 1 and for whom the investment return between t = 1 and t = 2
has turned out to be RG. Clearly, these latter funds are good. If we now make the natural
assumption (consistent with the analysis above) that the continuation expected returns for
these new investors at t = 2 are increasing in the fund’s type, then they will only invest
in funds that have not exited. Thus, for those funds who observe a = 1 at t = 0, there is
no added incentive to exit at t = 1 introduced by the prospect of future long-term flow. In
other words, adding a t = 2 flow-performance relationship to our model does not weaken the
negative result of Proposition 2.
This stark result must be qualified for applied purposes. Our model has one firm per
fund portfolio between t = 0 and t = 1, delivering a simple relationship between block prices
and portfolio returns. In reality, fund managers invest in multiple assets. Thus, investors’
inferences about their fund must be filtered through the performance of the rest of the fund’s
portfolio. A block liquidation would still lower the value of the fund’s portfolio, potentially
generating negative inferences, but the inference problem would be complex. In particular,
key differences may arise if the fund also has private information on the t = 1 returns or
holdings of some of these other assets. The fund manager may then camouflage the negative
return impact of a block sale with the high performance of the other assets in her portfolio
and thus not suffer from outflows upon exiting at t = 1. This is even more relevant in
the presence of long-term flows. Camouflaged exit at t = 1 enables the fund to avoid the
price hit associated with liquidating the block for vL at t = 2. If there is an increasing flow
performance relationship at t = 2, avoiding this price hit may bring additional benefits to
the fund. Of course, an offsetting force is that the fund may be able to camouflage the t = 2
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A full analysis of this issue would require modeling investor inferences with multiple
assets, microfounding camouflage by the fund, and examining the relative desirability of
early versus late camouflage. While this is beyond the scope of the current paper, we believe
that it represents an interesting direction for future research. Such investigation also holds
the promise of relevant regulatory implications. Mutual funds have relatively transparent
portfolios in comparison to other fund managers due to quarterly reporting requirements.
The discussion here suggests that such reporting requirements may have the unintended
consequence of making mutual funds reluctant to exit underperforming blocks, reducing
their effectiveness as company stewards.
B. Equilibrium Without Voluntary Exit
To complement our central nonexistence result (Proposition 2), we now show that there
exists an equilibrium in which principally flow-motivated mutual funds never choose to exit.15
For funds to choose not to exit in equilibrium, exit must come at sufficient cost in terms
of flow to the fund. Yet, if voluntary exit is an off-equilibrium event, so that block sales
arise only from liquidity shocks, the block liquidation price does not reflect the possibility
of exit due to a = 1 and thus exit cannot be inferred by investors from returns, rendering
the flow cost of exit meaningless. To constructively address this issue we first introduce a
small measure  > 0 of funds who are nonstrategic and exit whenever they observe a = 1.
The existence of such funds implies that informative exit will arise in equilibrium. We then
construct an equilibrium in which, given the presence of such nonstrategic funds, no strategic
fund will choose to exit. As → 0, the limiting equilibrium is characterized by the complete
absence of voluntary exit.16
PROPOSITION 4: For  sufficiently small and for γGM and RG sufficiently large, for any
w ∈ [0, 1) and φ ∈ [0, 1) there exists α̂(Θ, w, ) ∈ (0, 1) such that if α ≤ α̂(Θ, w, φ, ), there
is an equilibrium in which:











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
(ii) a strategic fund never chooses to sell at t = 1 regardless of the action chosen by the
manager.
The intuition is similar to that of Proposition 2. First, high γGM and RG generate an
increasing flow-performance relationship at t = 1. Thus, as before, funds lose existing clients
at t = 1 if they exit, and retain existing clients and garner additional flow from new investors
if they do not. However, not exiting when a = 1 will come at direct cost to the manager via
the self-invested component of the fund. Accordingly, funds will not exit if self-investment
is low.
If we let  → 0, it is easy to see that lim→0 α̂(Θ, w, φ, ) > 0. In this limit all funds are
strategic and the behavior of the manager in equilibrium is identical to that of the manager
of a firm in which there is no blockholder (as in the benchmark in Section I): the manager
will choose the perverse action a = 1 if and only if β ≥ βNo-L = ω2∆v. This is because the
blockholder never chooses to exit in equilibrium in the limit, and thus is “inactive,” imposing
no discipline on the manager.
To conclude our analysis of mutual funds, we examine a different definition of ability.
C. Could Exit Be a Good Signal of Managerial Ability?
In our baseline model, investors who infer that their fund exited at t = 1 lower their
opinion of the fund’s ability. Exit at t = 1 suggests that this fund was a poor stock picker
and thus unlikely to generate high returns between t = 1 and t = 2. The empirical literature
provides ample evidence of cross-sectional differences in skill amongst mutual funds when
measured via metrics that are related to stock selection ability (for example, Cremers and
Petajisto (2009), Fama and French (2010)). Recent survey evidence provides more specific
support for our modeling choice. In their survey of activism by institutional investors,
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2014) ask respondents about the factors that are important
to them in deciding whether to sell an underperforming block. Motivated by our paper, they
augment the set of survey answers to account for clients making negative inferences about
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state that such inferences are “important” or “very important” factors affecting the exit
threat. The only factors outweighing the importance of client inferences are the essential
considerations that must affect the exit decision of any blockholder: block size, liquidity, etc.
Thus, we believe that stock selection skill is the natural way to model ability differences in
our context, and use this as the metric in our baseline model.
From a theoretical perspective, however, she could construct alternative models in which
funds differ, instead, in their ability to spot perverse behavior ex post. In such models, it
is possible for exit to be a positive signal, because—since there is no question of ex ante
information—exit simply signals to investors the exiting fund knows that management is
acting suboptimally. Are our results robust to such a modification?
As in our baseline model, we argue that the flow motivations of mutual funds would again
interfere with their ability to effectively discipline management via exit. If exit is a good
signal of ability, principally flow-motivated funds exit excessively, that is, they sometimes
exit not because the manager has taken a perverse action but because they wish to attract
or retain flows. But this would again weaken the disciplining effect of the threat of exit:
knowing that he may be punished not just for bad but also sometimes for good choices, the
manager may be less inclined to behave. This intuition is formalized in a simple model in the
Internet Appendix. In that model, funds are distinguished by the quality of their information
about the internal working of firms in which they hold blocks. Firms are heterogeneous in the
degree to which they suffer from agency problems, with differences arising from the extent of
private benefits that the management can extract by effort avoidance. We show that when
funds are principally flow motivated, excessive exit will arise, and thus limit the disciplinary
effect of exit, precisely for those firms in which the moral hazard problem is most severe,
because it is for these firms that exit will be endogenously viewed as a positive signal of
ability on the part of the fund.
To summarize, using an alternative definition of ability centered around ex post observa-
tion of management modifies the empirical content of our results: instead of exiting too little











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
The economic content of our results, however, is unchanged: in both cases, competition for
flow weakens the ability of mutual funds to discipline management via the threat of exit.
VI. Hedge Funds
We now consider the efficacy of exit as a governance mechanism when the blockholder
is a hedge fund. How do the incentives identified in Section IV affect whether hedge funds
can credibly govern via the threat of exit? Given our prior analysis of mutual funds, our
discussion is best couched in comparative terms. As discussed above, like mutual funds,
hedge funds also face flow-performance relationships. Indeed, Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach
(2013) document that rewards from future flows matter four times as much for the average
hedge fund as compensation arising from explicit compensation. Thus, like mutual funds,
the need to compete for flow may negatively affect the ability of hedge funds to credibly
threaten to exit. In addition, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds charge a convex carry. As we
showed in Section IV, the possibility of earning a carry, particularly when combined with the
need to compete for flow, further weakens the ability of funds to credibly threaten to exit.
Thus, on the basis of these two factors, it may seem that hedge funds are less likely than
mutual funds to successfully use exit to govern. However, unlike mutual funds, hedge fund
managers invest significantly in their investment funds, and self-investment enhances the
incentives to exit. Will hedge funds behave similarly to principally flow motivated mutual
funds or will their higher degree of self-investment induce them to exit?
For the latter type of behavior to be a theoretical possibility, we need to show that for
sufficiently high self-investment, blockholders would choose to exit despite competing for flow
and earning a carry. Thus, we extend the arguments used to prove Proposition 2 to show
that funds that compete for flow and charge a carry will nevertheless exit in equilibrium if
their degree of self-investment is high enough.
PROPOSITION 5: For RG and γ
G
M sufficiently large and for any w ∈ [0, 1) and φ ∈ [0, 1),
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(i) each investor chooses to fire his fund if she sells at t = 1 and retains her otherwise;
(ii) the fund chooses to sell at t = 1 whenever the manager chooses a = 1.
In equilibrium investors chase flow and punish funds who exit. Thus, exit comes at a flow
and carry cost, but not exiting diminishes the value of the manager’s self-investment. If the
manager has sufficient skin in the game, then she will exit despite the flow and carry costs
implied by her action. It is worth noting that in this equilibrium the fund behaves exactly
as the principal blockholder of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009). Thus, the manager behaves
as in Section II: he chooses the perverse action a = 1 if and only if β ≥ βL > βNo-L = ω2∆v.
While Proposition 5 establishes the existence of equilibria in which funds with sufficient
self-investment will exit despite the disincentives created by their flow and carry motivations,
the question of whether the result has bearing on hedge fund behavior is a quantitative mat-
ter. Hedge funds typically charge AUM fees of around 2% (w = 0.02) and carry fees of
around 20% (φ = 0.2). As Fung and Hsieh (1999) point out, hedge funds “are typically
organized as limited partnerships, in which the investors are limited partners and the man-
agers are general partners [who invest] a significant proportion of their personal wealth into
the partnership.” While it is therefore clear that hedge fund managers self-invest, there is
little available data on the size of such self-investment. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009)
estimate a lower bound on self investment by computing the skin in the game implied only
by a reinvestment of fees (assuming no initial investment by the hedge fund manager) and
find α ≥ 0.071 with a standard deviation of 0.145. Papers calibrating hedge fund parame-
ters typically assume that α is between 0.1 (Jackwerth and Hodder (2007)) and 0.2 (He and
Krishnamurthy (2013)). Guided by this work, we assume in our computations that α = 0.1.
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funds are extremely capable. The structure of our model implies that when γGM → 1, for
any given (w, φ, α) whether a fund will exit when investors compete for flow is determined
by (θ, A), where A represents the measure of firms with agency problems. This makes it
feasible to transparently depict the set of parameters for which hedge funds will exit. The
(θ, A) that induce the fund to exit for (w, φ, α) = (0.02, 0.2, 0.1) are shown in the shaded
regions in Figure 1, Panels A to C (θ is plotted along the x-axis and A along the y-axis). In
Appendix B, we provide examples of parameter constellations with γGM < 1 such that hedge
funds will exit for (θ, A) pairs consistent with Figure 1, as well a detailed description of our
computational procedure.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 delivers an intuitive message. As the three panels illustrate, hedge fund exit is
viable exactly when θ and A are not large. This result is both intuitive and relevant from
an applied perspective. It is intuitive because a high θ implies that flows are large (because
the set of investors who are forced to liquidate as a result of shocks and find new funds is
increasing in θ).17 Further, since A is decreasing in γF, the measure of good funds, a low A
is commensurate with a high proportion of able funds. But the flow motivations of funds
in our model are a result of funds’ career concerns, and these are usually most potent when
most agents are bad and only a few are good (see, for example, Dasgupta and Prat (2008)).
The result is relevant from an applied perspective because hedge funds typically invest in
less liquid stocks (low θ) and may have a fairly talented manager pool (low A).
The decreasing incidence of exit moving from left to right across Panels A to C can be
understood as follows. The key force incentivizing hedge funds to exit is that not exiting is
costly to the manager’s self-invested funds, and this cost is increasing in the degree of value
destroyed by the choice of the perverse action. Thus, when the manager’s perverse action
choices do not destroy much value (vL = 2/3), exit becomes more challenging to sustain.
To the extent that the percentage value decrease for equity holders caused by any given
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leverage, our findings suggest that hedge fund exit may be more salient for more leveraged
firms.
Our microfounded, game-theoretic model is clearly not ideally suited for formal calibra-
tion exercises. Thus, it would be unreasonable to ask that these calculations be accepted as
literal representations of reality. However, we believe that these computations represent a
conservative approach. In our model, and therefore in our computations, all investors chase
performance at t = 1 and the hedge fund’s portfolio at t = 1 consists of a single asset, (i.e.,
the block) making the inference problem relatively simple for the investors. In reality, hedge
fund investors are often subject to lock-up periods and hedge funds own multiple assets
and are opaque. These factors are likely to enhance the hedge funds’ incentives to exit.
Locked-up investors cannot take money out of hedge funds even if they observe exit. The
presence of lock-ups is likely to enhance the incentives of a hedge fund to exit conditional on
observing a = 1 as it reduces the flow cost that such an action entails. Opacity is also likely
to enhance hedge funds’ incentives to exit in the presence of multiple investments. Opaque
hedge funds, with complex assets that are not easy to mark to market, may well have private
information about the value of these assets and thus may be able to camouflage the price
impact of exit at t = 1. As a result, and as already discussed in Section V.A.2, they may
be more inclined to exit. It is worth noting that for an opaque hedge fund with multiple
investments, the effect of carry on exit may weaken. Not exiting still creates an artificial
price increase at t = 1, enhancing t = 1 carry. However, if the rest of the portfolio is likely
to generate a positive carry at t = 2 (and exit at t = 1 can be camouflaged, thus avoiding
outflows), then exiting at t = 1 may increase t = 2 carry because it eliminates t = 2 losses
from holding the underperforming block. Taking all these factors into account, it is reason-
able to conclude that hedge funds may be more willing to exit in reality than is implied by
our model. Accordingly, our calculations represent a conservative estimate and form a basis
for concluding that hedge funds would effectively use exit even allowing for some significant
margin of error to account for the stylized aspects of the model. It is worth noting that the
empirical findings of Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) suggest that hedge funds do successfully
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VII. Exit, Voice, and Money Managers
We now consider the possibility of active monitoring (the use of voice) by delegated
blockholders. In a setting with both active and passive monitoring, it is necessary to take
a view on the interaction of the two. Existing literature typically thinks of exit and voice
as substitutes. Two important contributions to this literature include Kahn and Winton
(1998) and Maug (1998). Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that the incentives of blockholders
to speculate or intervene may be in conflict. They theoretically delineate conditions under
which a blockholder will choose to intervene or exit. Maug (1998) also considers the choice
between exit and voice, and argues that—in addition to aiding exit—liquidity can enhance
voice by facilitating block formation. In contrast, in our analysis, we are guided by an
additional source of interaction between active and passive monitoring outlined in Hirschman
(1970). Hirschman argues that exit and voice are potentially complementary governance
mechanisms: the existence of the threat of exit makes blockholder voice worth listening to.
If voice and exit are complementary, do our results on the effect of funds’ compensation on
exit correspond to different ability and willingness to use voice? We consider this question
next.
Let us recall our baseline model with a fund that has α high enough to satisfy the
conditions of Proposition 5. For firms with agency problems in which β ≤ βL, the existence
of the threat of exit in and of itself prevents perverse behavior by the manager at no cost
to the fund (since the threat of exit is not executed for these firms in equilibrium), while
for firms with β > βL, the perverse action cannot be prevented by the threat of exit and
the fund must engage in costly exit in equilibrium. Consider the following modification of
the model. Imagine that following block formation, at t = 0, the fund learns whether the
firm type is such that the threat of exit alone will discipline the manager, that is, whether
β > βL, before the manager makes his action choice. If β > βL, could the fund be tempted
to use voice to discipline management?
We model voice as follows. If the fund learns that the threat of exit alone is insufficient,
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changes in business strategy) to the firm. Formulating the proposal comes at effort cost e
to the fund. The proposal may be accepted or rejected by the manager. If accepted, the
resulting change in business strategy leads the manager to relinquish the perverse action
(that is, choose a = 0) and yields him nonpecuniary benefits ρ ∈ (0, βL − ω2∆v) over and
above his normal compensation from choosing a = 0. The cost e is sunk regardless of whether
the manager accepts or rejects the proposal. Our formulation for voice can be interpreted
as follows: the change in business strategy generates a reduction in the effort cost to the
manager for choosing a = 0, which translates into an increase in benefits for choosing a = 0.18
This formulation for voice is consistent with the description of active monitoring by hedge
funds given by Brav et al. (2008), who argue that activist hedge funds propose an array
of strategic, operational, and financial remedies. For simplicity, we assume that the voice
pre-game described here is unobservable to investors and the market.
PROPOSITION 6: For γGM and RG large enough
19, e small enough, and for β ∈ [βL, βL + ρ]:
1. for α > α′ (Θ, w, φ), there exists an equilibrium in which funds successfully use voice
to prevent the perverse action (and thus avoid exit);
2. for α < α̂(Θ, w, φ, 0), there exists an equilibrium in which funds do not use voice.
Here, α̂(Θ, w, φ, 0) = lim→0 α̂(Θ, w, φ, ), where α̂(Θ, w, φ, ) is defined in Proposition 4 and
α′ (Θ, w, φ) is defined in Proposition 5.
Thus, there exist equilibria in our model that jointly identify a class of firms for which
the threat of exit and voice are complementary in generating good governance, because
blockholders will use voice if and only if they can credibly threaten to exit. Intuitively, the
manager’s payoff from ignoring voice depends on whether the fund exits if voice is ignored,
and is higher when the fund does not exit than when she does. This reduces the reward
required to induce the manager to choose a = 0 when the fund uses voice. Indeed, for
ρ ∈ (0, βL − ω2∆v), blockholders’ voice will never induce the manager to choose a = 0 over
a = 1 if he knows that the fund will not exit. This is not true when he instead anticipates











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
α will use voice backed by the threat of exit. The use of voice reduces the range of β for
which the manager takes the perverse action from β ≥ βL to β ≥ βL + ρ, thereby making
voice an additional corporate governance instrument. In contrast, funds with low α, being
unable to credibly threaten to exit, never induce the manager to take a = 0 through voice if
ρ ∈ (0, βL − ω2∆v) and thus rationally refrain from paying the costs of using voice.
The required conditions on α above are identical to those already introduced in Propo-
sitions 4 and 5. Our results on voice may therefore be interpreted in terms of mutual funds
and hedge funds. Accordingly, this result provides a potential explanation—based on the in-
teraction between voice and exit—for the empirical regularity that hedge funds use voice and
produce significant gains for shareholders in target companies (Brav et al. (2008)), Becht,
Franks, and Grant (2010)), while mutual funds choose to remain silent and do not deliver
similar gains (Karpoff (2001), Barber (2006), and Kahan and Rock (2007)).
VIII. Conclusions
Blockholders are often seen as a solution to problems arising from the separation of
ownership and control in publicly traded corporations. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) show
that the threat of exit can be an effective form of corporate governance when the blockholder
is a profit-maximizing principal. Motivated by the prevalence of equity blocks held by
delegated portfolio managers, we analyze whether agency frictions arising from delegated
portfolio management may affect the ability of blockholders to govern through exit.
We show that when investors chase performance, funds will be reluctant to exit underper-
forming blocks. The reason is that when funds are differentiated by stock selection ability,
exit is informative about skill and endogenously generates outflows. The perverse incentives
generated by competition for flow operates through both AUM fees and carried interest, the
components of standard “two and twenty” compensation contracts. Offsetting incentives are
provided by proprietary investment in funds that provide direct exposure to portfolio value.
Thus, for a given two and twenty contract, a fund will be successful in using exit to govern
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managers self-invest very little, may be less successful in governing via the threat of exit
than hedge funds, whose managers self-invest significantly.
While no systematic attempt has been made to empirically connect the type of money
manager with the effectiveness of exit, some existing empirical results are consistent with
our theoretical prediction. In contrast, a significant empirical literature connects the type
of asset manager to the effectiveness of blockholder voice. We provide theoretical support
for this literature by demonstrating the potential complementarity between exit and voice:
the threat of exit determines the effectiveness of voice, implying that funds with little skin
in the game will be unlikely to be vocal activists.
Our analysis examines the interplay of two distinct agency problems: between the man-
agers and equity holders of firms on the one hand, and between delegating investors and their
portfolio managers on the other. Both of these problems are ubiquitous. Our results show
that the two agency problems may interact in crucial ways: in particular, the existence of the
latter may undermine traditional solutions to the former. Our findings therefore emphasize
the potential importance of frictions arising from the delegation of portfolio management to
the effectiveness of corporate governance.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We first compute the manager’s strategy and then the block-
holder’s. If the manager chooses a = 1, he knows that the blockholder will sell her shares at
t = 1 at P s1 and that P2 = vL. Thus, his expected utility is
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If he does not choose a = 1, he knows that the blockholder will sell her shares at t = 1 only
for liquidity reasons—which occurs with probability θ—and that the market price is P ns1 ; he
also knows that P2 = vH. Thus, his expected utility is
ω1P1 + ω2P2 = ω1(θP
s
1 + (1− θ)P ns1 ) + ω2vH. (A.1)
Hence, the manager’s strategy is
sM(β) =
1 if β − ω1(1− θ)(P
ns
1 − P s1)− ω2∆v ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(A.2)
Since β − ω1(P ns1 − P s1) − ω2∆v is increasing in β, the manager’s best response will be
characterised by a cutoff point βL, such that he takes the perverse action for any β ≥ βL,
where the cutoff is equal to the fixed point of the following equation:
βL = ω1(1− θ)(P ns1 (βL)− P s1(βL)) + ω2∆v.
The cutoff point βL is unique if P
ns
1 (βL) − P s1(βL) is decreasing in βL. To establish this, we
compute P s1(βL) and P
ns
1 (βL) as functions of βL. When the blockholder sells her shares, the
market does not know whether she does so for liquidity or speculative reasons, and hence
P s1(βL) = vL + ∆v
θ
[
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
]
θ + (1− θ)AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
. (A.3)
If the blockholder does not sell, the market infers that the manager has not taken the
perverse action and that the value of the firm is vH. Hence,
P ns1 (βL) = vH.
Since P(β˜ ≥ βL) is decreasing in βL, it is immediate that
P ns1 (βL)− P s1(βL) = ∆v
AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
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is decreasing in βL, establishing the uniqueness of βL.
To conclude the characterization of the manager’s strategy, we now show that βL > βNo-L.
It is immediate from the previous expression that P ns1 (βL) − P s1(βL) ≥ 0. It follows that
βL ≥ βNo-L. To show that the inequality is strict, we first assume that βL = βNo-L. Since
βNo-L = ω2∆v, this implies that P(β˜ ≥ βL) = P(β˜ ≥ ω2∆v) = 1− F (ω2∆v) = 0. But, since
β¯ > ω2∆v and F is strictly increasing, we have that F (ω2∆v) < 1, a contradiction. Thus,
βL > βNo-L.
The blockholder’s incentives are immediate. If she observes that the manager has chosen
a = 1, then if she does not exit she will receive vL while if she does she will receive P
s
1(βL) > vL
(from equation (A.3)). Thus, she exits. If she observes that the manager has chosen a = 0,
then if she does not exit she will receive vH while if she does she will receive P
s
1(βL) < vH.
Thus, she does not exit.
Proof of Proposition 2: We focus here on firms whose managers face an agency problem,
and we attempt to construct an equilibrium in which each fund’s strategy involves the use of
exit as in Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), that is, for those funds not hit by a liquidity shock:
sF(a) =
ns if a = 0s if a = 1. (A.4)
We first construct each manager’s best response to such a strategy. Since the putative equi-
librium behavior of the fund in (A.4) is identical to the blockholder’s strategy in Proposition
1, it follows immediately that the manager will follow the strategy in (A.2). Note that (the
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We now proceed to compute the best response of an investor and delineate conditions








as long as all other investors also do so.
We begin with two preliminaries. First, we compute the measure of flows implied by the
investors’ strategy. In this equilibrium at t = 1, a measure (1 − α)(1 − θ)AP(β˜ ≥ βL) of
investors voluntarily liquidates the funds that have sold and optimally replaces them with
funds that have not sold. In addition, a measure (1 − α)θ of investors are matched with
funds that have been hit by a liquidity shock and thus are looking to replace them with funds
that have not sold. Funds that have not sold are in measure (1− θ)
(
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
)
. The
investors from the funds that have sold will be distributed proportionally to the funds that
have not sold. Thus, each fund that has not sold will get a proportion
(1− α)
[




1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
)
of new investors. How much money does each new investor bring to a fund that has not
sold?
Denote the block price at t = 0 by P0. Given the initial mix of investment in the fund,
this means that the fund manager contributed αP0 and each of a continuum of measure 1−α
investors contributed P0 each, giving rise to a total investment of αP0 + (1− α)P0 = P0.
Conditional on (voluntary or forced) liquidation, the market value of the initial investment
of P0 at t = 1 is P
s
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P0
P0
P s1 = P
s








1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
) P s1 =: Kα. (A.6)
Second, we compute the expected return to new investments conditional on the two pos-
sible managerial actions that the fund may observe. Conditional on a = 1, the posterior
probability that the fund is good is
γ
F
= P(τF = G | a = 1) = γF(1− γ
G
M)
γF(1− γGM) + (1− γF)(1− γBM)
< γF. (A.7)
Thus, the expected per-dollar return from the new investments is R = γ
F
RG + (1− γF)RB.
Since γ
F
is decreasing in γGM, limγGM→1 γF = 0, and RB < 1, there exists a γ
G
M (RG;RB, γF) ∈




(RG;RB, γF) , (A.8)
then R < 1.
In contrast, conditional on a = 0 the posterior probability that the fund is good is
γ̂sepF = P(τ
F = G | a = 0) =
γF
[
γGM + (1− γGM)(1− P(β˜ ≥ βL))
]
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
> γF. (A.9)
Thus, the expected per-dollar return from the new investments is
R̂sep = γ̂
sep
F RG + (1− γ̂sepF )RB = RB + ∆R
γF
[
γGM + (1− γGM)(1− P(β˜ ≥ βL))
]
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βL)
.




Investors may infer from returns that either their fund has not sold (the portfolio value is
P ns1 ) or that the fund has sold (the portfolio value is P
s
1). Conditional on the fund selling, the
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down) or that the fund has chosen to sell (and thus remains open for potential investment).
Consider the latter investor first. This investor may:
1. Retain the fund (i.e., leave the proceeds received from the fund with the fund).
2. Fire the fund, after paying the carry at t = 1, and invest in the index asset:
P s1 − φ (P s1 − P0)+ .








vH +KαR̂sep − (P ns1 +Kα)
)+ ]
carry at t=2
−φ (P s1 − P0)+
carry at t=1
− wP s1





(vH +KαR̂sep) represents the expected dollar amount he receives from
the new fund: since he has fired his original fund and received P s1 , he has a claim to
P s1
Pns1 +Kα
of the new fund’s payoff. The payoff of a fund that has not sold is vH +KαR̂sep
since the fund keeps her block and invests the additional wealth that she receives,
Kα, in the new opportunity, which returns R̂sep. Further, the t = 1 contingent fee is
φ (P s1 − P0)+ because the investor pays a fraction P0P0 (his dollar investment divided by
the total dollar value of the block at t = 0) of a total fee of φ (P s1 − P0)+, and the











of a total fee of φ
(
vH +KαR̂sep − (P ns1 +Kα)
)+
.
It is immediate that (1) is dominated by (2): under (A.8) the fund can at best generate
index returns, so by retaining the fund, the investor would pay fees to undertake investments
that he can access directly. Equilibrium requires the payoff to (3) to be higher than the payoff
to (2), which can be ensured by
R̂sep ≥ 1 + w(vH +Kα)
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Since R̂sep is increasing in RG and limRG→∞ R̂sep = ∞, there exists a RG,2(γGM; Θ) ∈ R++
such that if
RG ≥ RG,2(γGM; Θ), (A.12)
then inequality (A.11) holds.
Investors whose funds shut down have options (2) and (3) above but not option (1).
Under (A.11), they will prefer option (3).
Consider an investor who has inferred that his fund has not sold. This investor may:








vH +KαR̂sep − (P ns1 +Kα)
)+ ]
− φ (P ns1 − P0)+ − wP ns1 .
2. Fire the fund and invest in the index:
P ns1 − φ (P ns1 − P0)+ .








vH +KαR̂sep − (P ns1 +Kα)
)+ ]
− φ (P ns1 − P0)+ − wP ns1 .
Clearly, the investor is indifferent between (1) and (3) but prefers either to (2) as long
as condition (A.12) holds.
Thus, we have established that under conditions (A.8), (A.10), and (A.12), given the
fund’s strategy in (A.4) each investor will best respond by (A.5). We now show that if each
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Suppose that a fund observes a = 0. If she chooses to hold the block, she is retained by
her investor and receives inflows of Kα:
(1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0)+ + w (P ns1 +Kα)− wαP ns1 +
+













If she exits, she gets (1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)+ + αP s1 . Thus, she clearly prefers to retain.
Suppose that the fund observes a = 1. If she sells, she is fired and gets
Πs := (1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)+ + αP s1 .
If she does not sell, she retains investor capital and chooses optimally whether to invest in the
new opportunities. The reason the fund may be tempted to invest in the new opportunities
despite the fact that, given (A.8), conditional on a = 1 such investment has negative net












is the payoff from not selling and not investing in the new opportunities, and











vL +KαRG − P ns1 −Kα
)+
is the payoff from not selling and investing in the new opportunities. Note that if she does
not invest in the new opportunities she earns no carry at t = 2 because the returns between
t = 1 and t = 2 are vL + Kα − (P ns1 +Kα), which are negative since P ns1 − P0 > 0 and
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Let us first compare Πs with Π
NI
ns . We have that Πs ≥ ΠNIns if




Given the equilibrium strategies, the price of the block at t = 0 is given by P0 = vL +
∆v [1− AP (β ≥ βL)], which is greater than P s1 (given by equation (A.3)), thus (1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)+ =
0. In addition, again using the proof of Proposition 1, P ns1 = vH. Thus, rearranging, the
fund will exit if
α
(
vH (φ+ w) + P
s




− wKα ≥ wvH + φ (vH − P0) . (A.14)
Define
f(α) := vH (φ+ w) + P
s






Now it is easy to see that
lim
α→0
αf(α) = −wKα=0 < 0 < wvH + φ (vH − P0) ,
and, since limα→1 Kα = 0,
lim
α→1
αf(α) = vH (φ+ w)+P
s
1−φP0−vL = wvH +φ (vH − P0)+P s1−vL > wvH +φ (vH − P0) .
Thus, continuity implies that there exists an α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that α¯f (α¯) = wvH+φ (vH − P0).
Computing the derivative of f (α) gives









Since Kα > 0 and K
′
α < 0, f
′(α) > 0. Thus, for any α such that f (α) > 0, αf (α) is
increasing in α. Now note that since α¯f (α¯) > 0, it follows that f (α¯) > 0. Then, for any
α̂ < α¯, one of two possible statements must be true. Either f (α̂) > 0, in which case αf (α) is
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in which case α̂f (α̂) ≤ 0 < wvH + φ (vH − P0). Thus, for any α < α¯, Πs < ΠNIns . For any
α < α¯, one of the following statements must be true:
1. ΠNIns > Π
I






= ΠNIns and since Πs < Π
NI
ns the fund will not exit.
2. ΠNIns < Π
I






= ΠIns > Π
NI
ns > Πs. Thus, the fund will not exit.
Proof of Proposition 3: We only state here the part of the proof that deviates from that
of Proposition 2. Since each fund is measure zero, a change in the investor base in one
fund does not change the incentives of any other fund. Similarly, for any investor within
the chosen fund, it is unnecessary to compute the best response again: if the investor is
attentive, his incentives are identical to those of the investors in the baseline model, whereas
if the investor is inattentive, he is inactive. To demonstrate that there is no equilibrium
in which any fund chooses to sell if and only if she observes a = 1, we simply show that
for small enough α, the fund that observes a = 1 will fail to exit. Suppose that the fund
observes a = 1. Since φ = 0 the fund will not invest in new opportunities at t = 1 upon
observing a = 1. If she sells, she is fired and gets αP s1 + (1− α) ιwP s1 , since she is retained
by the inattentive investors. If she does not sell she gets




Thus, the fund will adopt strategy (A.4) if













− wKα ≥ w (vH − ιP s1) . (A.15)
Following steps identical to the proof of Proposition 2, it is clear that there exists α¯ ∈
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above inequality cannot be satisfied. To see that the bound α¯ is decreasing in ι, implicitly













2 − wK ′α¯
)
= −(1− α)wP s1 ,






K ′α¯ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: We construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the action
of the fund that observes the perverse action is the same as the action of the fund that
observes the non-perverse action, except for a small measure  of nonstrategic funds that sell
whenever they observe a = 1. We then study the limit of this equilibrium. In the limit, as
→ 0, no fund exits.
The structure of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. We sketch the proof here,
highlighting only the points of departure from that argument.
Let’s start with the manager’s strategy. The manager’s expected utility if he chooses
a = 1 is
β + ω1 [(θ + (1− θ))P s1 + (1− θ)(1− )P ns1 ] + ω2vL.
This is because he knows that at time 1 the fund is going to sell either for liquidity reasons
(which occur with probability θ) or because she is nonstrategic (which occurs with probability
). The manager’s expected utility from a = 0 is the same as that in Proposition 2 (see
equation (A.1)). As before, the manager’s strategy will be characterized by a threshold
βpool, which is now implicitly defined by
βpool = ω1(1− θ)(P ns1 (βpool)− P s1(βpool)) + ω2∆v, (A.16)
where
P ns1 (βpool) = vL + ∆v
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
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and
P s1(βpool) = vL + ∆v
θ[1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)]
θ + (1− θ)AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
.
LEMMA 1: For  sufficiently small, βpool is unique.
Proof of Lemma 1 : We want to show that the function on the RHS of equation (A.16)
has at most one fixed point on [0, β¯] for small . Since the vertical intercept of the function
on the RHS of equation (A.16) is strictly positive (ω2∆v) and the function is everywhere
differentiable, as long as the slope of such function is less then one, it cannot cross the
function on the LHS of equation (A.16) twice. Consider the limiting case → 0 and appeal









= −∆vAP(β ≥ βpool)
′(1− )
[1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)]2









= −∆vθAP(β ≥ βpool)
′[θ + (1− θ)]


















is bounded and for  = 0, P ns1 (βpool)−P s1(βpool) = 0, then for  small, ω1(1−θ) ∂∂βpool (P ns1 (βpool)−
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We now proceed to compute the best response of an investor and delineate conditions
under which, given the fund’s strategy, it is a best response for such an investor to follow
the strategy in (A.5).
We use a similar argument to that in the proof of Proposition 2 and find that, in this
equilibrium, at t = 1 funds that have not sold get inflows of
θ + (1− θ)AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
(1− θ)
(
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
)(1− α)P s1 =: kα.
First note that if a fund observes the manager choose a = 1, she updates her beliefs
about her own type to be as in equation (A.7). Thus, under condition (A.8), the expected
per-dollar return from new investments is R < 1.





γGM + (1− γGM)(1− P(β˜ ≥ βpool))
]
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
> γF.
Thus, the expected per-dollar returns from the new investments is
R̂pool = γ̂
pool
F RG + (1− γ̂poolF )RB = RB + ∆R
γF
[
γGM + (1− γGM)(1− P(β˜ ≥ βpool))
]
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
.






Investors may infer from returns that either their fund has not sold (the portfolio value
is P ns1 ) or the fund has sold (the portfolio value is P
s
1). Conditional on the fund selling, the
investor knows that either the fund has experienced a liquidity shock (and hence is shutting
down) or the fund has chosen to sell (and thus remains open for potential investment).
Consider first the latter investor who observes that his portfolio value is P s1 at t = 1. This
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inferred that his fund sold (listed there as (1), (2), and (3)). However, a difference is that in
this equilibrium the investor believes that by investing in funds that have not sold (option
(3)) the lower bound on his expected returns is R¯nspool instead of R̂sep, where
R¯nspool = P(a = 1 | aF = ns)R + P(a = 0 | aF = ns)R̂pool =
=
(1− )AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
R +
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
1− AP(β˜ ≥ βpool)
R̂pool.
This is because funds that have not sold may have observed a = 0, in which case they will
optimally invest at t = 1 at an expected return of R̂pool, or may have observed a = 1, in
which case they can invest in either new investments at an expected return of R or the index
asset at an expected return of one. Since R < 1, R¯nspool constitutes a lower bound on the
investor’s expected return.
As in the proof of Proposition 2, the investor prefers (2) to (1); he also prefers (3) to (2),
if
R¯nspool ≥ 1 +
w(P ns1 + kα)
(1− φ)kα . (A.18)
Since R¯nspool is increasing in RG and limRG→∞ R¯
ns
pool = ∞, there exists a RpoolG,2 (γGM; Θ) ∈ R++
such that if
RG ≥ RpoolG,2 (γGM; Θ), (A.19)
then inequality (A.18) holds. Thus, under condition (A.19), the investor who fires the fund
invests in a fund that has not sold.
The investor whose fund is hit by a liquidity shock is identical to the investor above,
except that he lacks option (1). Thus, again, this investor invests with a fund that has not
sold.
Finally, we compute the best response of an investor who has inferred on the basis of the
portfolio value of his fund that his fund has not sold at t = 1. This investor has the same
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sell. However, here in computing the payoffs to the respective options, we replace vH by P
ns
1
and R̂sep by R¯
ns





P ns1 + kα
≥ w
1− φ.
This is satisfied as long as inequality (A.19) holds.
Thus, we have established that under conditions (A.8), (A.17), and (A.19), given the
funds’ strategy described above, each investor will best respond by (A.5). It remains to
show that the non-naive fund will choose not to sell regardless of observing a = 0 or a = 1.
Suppose that a fund observes a = 0. If she chooses to hold the block, she is retained by her
investor, receives inflows of kα, and gets
(1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0)+ + w (P ns1 + kα)− wαP ns1 +
+
(1− α)P ns1 + kα
P ns1 + kα
φ
(









If she exits, she gets (1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)+ + αP s1 . Thus, she clearly prefers to hold.
Suppose that the fund observes a = 1. If she sells, she is fired and gets
Πs := (1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)+ + αP s1 .
If she does not sell, she retains investor capital and chooses optimally whether to invest in the
new opportunities. The reason the fund may be tempted to invest in the new opportunities
despite the fact that, given (A.8), conditional on a = 1 such investment has negative net








ΠNIns := (1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0) + w (P ns1 + kα)− wαP ns1 +
αP ns1
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and
ΠIns := (1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0) + w (P ns1 + kα)− wαP ns1 +
αP ns1
P ns1 + kα
(vL + kαR) +
+
(1− α)P ns1 + kα





vL + kαRG − P ns1 − kα
)+
.
Note that if she does not invest in new investment opportunities she does not earn a
carry at t = 2. In fact, the returns between t = 1 and t = 2 are (vL + kα − (P ns1 + kα)),








Let us first compare Πs with Π
NI
ns . We have Πs < Π
NI
ns if
(1− α)φ (P s1 − P0)++αP s1 ≤ (1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0)+w (P ns1 + kα)−wαP ns1 +
αP ns1
P ns1 + kα
(vL + kα) .
Given the equilibrium strategies, the price of the block at t = 0 is given by P0 = vL +




P ns1 (φ+ w) + P
s
1 − φP0 −
P ns1 (vL + kα)
P ns1 + kα
)
− wkα ≤ wP ns1 + φ (P ns1 − P0) . (A.20)
Define
h(α) := P ns1 (φ+ w) + P
s
1 − φP0 −
P ns1 (vL + kα)




Now it is easy to see that
lim
α→0
αh(α) = −wkα=0 < 0 < wP ns1 + φ (P ns1 − P0) ,
and, since limα→1 kα = 0, that
lim
α→1
αh(α) = P ns1 (φ+ w)+P
s
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Thus, continuity implies that there exists an α̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that α̂h (α̂) = wP ns1 +φ (P ns1 − P0).















Since kα > 0 and k
′
α < 0, it follows that h
′(α) > 0. Thus, for any α such that h (α) > 0,
αh (α) is increasing in α. In particular, since h (α̂) > 0, αh (α) is increasing in α for α = α̂.
For any α′ < α̂, one of two possible statements may be true. Either h (α′) > 0, in which case
αh (α) is increasing in α for all α ∈ [α′, α̂] and thus α′h (α′) < α̂h (α̂) = wP ns1 +φ (P ns1 − P0),
or h (α′) ≤ 0, in which case α′h (α′) ≤ 0 < wP ns1 + φ (P ns1 − P0). Thus, for any α < α̂,
Πs < Π
NI
ns . For any α < α̂, one of the following statements must be true:
1. ΠNIns > Π
I






= ΠNIns and since Πs < Π
NI
ns the fund will not exit.
2. ΠNIns < Π
I






= ΠIns > Π
NI
ns > Πs. Thus, the fund will not exit.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof builds directly on that of Proposition 2, where we












ns are as defined in the proof of Proposition 2. We first observe that








since R < 1. Consider now the term
φ
(
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Since Kα → 0 monotonically as α → 1, for any RG, there exists some α˜ < 1 such that
Kα (RG − 1)−∆v < 0 for α > α˜ and thus
φ
(
Kα (RG − 1)−∆v
)+
= 0.






= ΠNIns . Now, let us check the case in which Π
NI
ns < Πs.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that this was equivalent to checking that αf (α) ≥
wvH + φ (vH − P0), where
f(α) := vH (φ+ w) + P
s






and that there exists an α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that α¯f (α¯) = wvH + φ (vH − P0). Since f ′(α) > 0
and f (α¯) > 0, αf (α) is increasing for α ≥ α¯. Thus, for all α ∈ [α¯, 1), αf (α) ≥ wvH +
φ (vH − P0). For α > max (α¯, α˜) := α′, the fund exits.
Proof of Proposition 6: We consider the following pre-game to the exit game. If voice is
not used or if voice is used and ignored, then the exit game begins with choices and payoffs
to the fund and manager as in the baseline. If voice is used and the manager accepts, he
must choose a = 0 (and receives at t = 2 the normal payoff augmented by ρ), and the
exit game begins, where the fund can decide whether to exit. In this proof, we reuse two
thresholds defined in the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5: α̂(Θ, w, φ, 0) = lim→0 α̂(Θ, w, φ, )
and α′ (Θ, w, φ), respectively, which we denote α̂ and α′ for brevity. We consider two cases:
α > α′ and α < α̂.
Let α > α′. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in which the fund uses voice and
the manager ignores voice if β > βL + ρ and accepts voice otherwise. We solve the game by
backward induction.
Suppose voice is not used or is used and ignored. In either case, the exit game begins and
the manager’s payoffs are as in the baseline model. It is easy to construct an equilibrium in
which the fund chooses to exit if and only if a = 1. Investors don’t know about the voice
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observes a = 1, she faces the same choice as in the baseline and exits since α > α′. If the
fund observes a = 0, what will she do? If the fund exits she is fired, earning αP s1 . If she
does not exit, she is retained, and if she then invests in the index asset she earns




Clearly, she will not exit. Thus, the fund chooses to exit if and only if a = 1, and the
manager chooses a = 1 because β ≥ βL as in the baseline. Thus, for α > α′, if voice is not
used or used and ignored, the manager chooses a = 1 and the fund exits. If voice is used
and accepted, then the manager chooses a = 0. The fund’s problem is then identical to the
case above in which she observes a = 0. Thus, she chooses not to exit.
Given this, we now check the strategies in the pre-game. Let’s check the manager’s
strategy first. The fund uses voice and the manager is faced with the option to accept or
reject the proposal. If he accepts the fund’s proposal he has to choose a = 0, the fund does
not exit, and he gets ω1(θP
s
1 + (1 − θ)P ns1 ) + ω2vH + ρ. If he ignores voice he then chooses
a = 1, the fund exits, and he gets β + ω1P
s




1 + (1− θ)P ns1 ) + ω2vH + ρ ≥ β + ω1P s1 + ω2vL, that is, if β ≤ βL + ρ.
Let’s now check the fund’s strategy. If the fund does not use voice, the manager chooses a = 1
and the fund exits, is fired, and earns αP s1 . If the fund uses voice, then β ∈ (βL, βL + ρ],
the manager accepts and the fund gets at least χ− e, but otherwise the manager rejects and
chooses a = 1, in which case the fund gets αP s1 − e. So, the fund loses by using voice when
β > βL + ρ and gains when β ∈ (βL, βL + ρ]. Since the losses are on the order of e and the
gains are not, and e can be as small as desired, there exists an e small enough such that the
fund uses voice.
Let α < α̂. We shall show that there exists an equilibrium in which the fund does not
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existence of an equilibrium without voluntary exit, as before we allow for the existence of an
-measure of nonstrategic funds and consider the limiting case in which → 0.
Suppose voice is not used or is used and ignored. In either case, the exit game begins
and the manager’s payoffs are identical to the baseline model. It is easy to construct an
equilibrium in which the fund never exits. Investors don’t know about the voice pre-game,
and thus (for γGM and RG high enough) will behave as in the baseline model. Thus, if a fund
observes a = 1, she faces the same choice as in the baseline model, and does not exit since
α < α̂. If the fund observes a = 0, what will she do? If the fund exits she is fired, earning
αP s1 . If she does not exit, she is retained and if she then invests in the index asset, she earns
(1− α)φ (P ns1 − P0)+ + w(1− α)P ns1 + wkα +
αP ns1
P ns1 + kα
(vH + kα) ,
Clearly, she will not exit. Thus, given that the fund never exits, the manager will choose
a = 1 whenever β > βNo-L as in the baseline. Since β > βL > βNo-L, he chooses a = 1 and
the fund does not exit. If voice is used and accepted, then the manager chooses a = 0. The
fund’s problem is then identical to the case above in which she observes a = 0. Thus, she
chooses not to exit.
Given this, we now check the strategies in the pre-game. Let’s check the manager’s
strategy first. The fund does not use voice. Thus, the manager has no decision to make
in the pre-game on the equilibrium path. Let’s now check the fund’s strategy. If no voice






where ΠIns and Π
NI
ns are defined in the proof of Proposition 4. If the fund uses voice, then the
manager has (off equilibrium) the option to accept or reject it. If he accepts, he has to choose
a = 0 and gets ω1(θP
s
1 +(1−θ)P ns1 )+ω2vH +ρ. If he ignores voice, he goes on to choose a = 1
and, since the fund does not exit, he earns β + ω1(θP
s
1 + (1 − θ)P ns1 ) + ω2vL. He therefore
prefers to ignore voice as long as ρ < β − ω2∆v. Since by assumption ρ < βL − ω2∆v,
ρ < β − ω2∆v for all β > βL. Therefore, the manager ignores voice and chooses a = 1 and
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Appendix B. Numerical Examples
Here we provide details for the computations referred to in Sections V and VI. In Section
V we argue that Proposition 2 applies to mutual funds with self-investment levels consis-
tent with the data. In Section VI, we argue that there exist model parameters for which
Proposition 5 applies to hedge funds with self-investment levels consistent with the data.
Propositions 2 and 5 share sufficient conditions on RG and γ
G
M (given by conditions (A.8),







γ̂F(1− φ)Kα , (B.1)
where γ̂F is defined in (A.9), and (A.8) can be expressed as
γGM ≥ 1−
(1− γF)(1− γBM)(1−RB)
γF(RG − 1) . (B.2)
Throughout our examples we set the AUM fee to w = 0.02 and assume that β is uniformly
distributed on [0,1]. We normalize vH = 1. To take no view on the relative sensitivity of
executive compensation to long-term versus short-term stock prices, we set ω1 = ω2 = 1/2.
For mutual funds we set φ = 0 while for hedge funds we set φ = 0.2. We choose α as
appropriate below. We conduct our computations using Mathematica.
A. Mutual Funds
Since φ = 0 for mutual funds, the relevant condition (A.13) determining whether the
fund will exit reduces to
αP s1 ≥ w(1− α)vH + wKα +
αvH
vH +Kα
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It is easy to see that, for a given vH, vL, α, w, φ, ω1, and ω2, whether inequality (B.3) is
satisfied depends on the values of A and θ. To obtain a highly conservative estimate, we set
α = 0.01. Inequality (B.3) then becomes




Since P s1 < 1, and Kα and vL are both positive, this inequality is never satisfied. This
means that whenever investors chase performance, funds with α = 0.01 will never exit for
any (θ, A). Thus, it only remains to check the two conditions (B.1) and (B.2), which jointly
guarantee performance chasing. Since the bound on RG given by condition (B.1) is a function
of γGM, and in turn the bound on γ
G
M given by condition (B.2) is a function of RG, we use
a guess and verify procedure. First, we guess a γGM and find a lower bound on RG. Next,
we choose an RG consistent with that bound and substitute it into condition (B.2), and
we check whether our initial choice of γGM satisfies this condition. For example, consider
the following two parameterizations, where the interpretation should account for the fact
that the required conditions are sufficient and not necessary for our results. For vL = 2/3,
γF = 0.7, γ
B
M = 0.4, γ
G
M = 0.9, RB = 0.9, and θ = 0.4, (B.1) reduces to RG ≥ 1.076, that is,
the required return from the best mutual funds is less than 10%. Substituting RG = 1.076 in
(B.2) gives γGM ≥ 0.662, which is clearly satisfied with γGM = 0.9. Alternatively, for vL = 1/3,
γF = 0.5, γ
B
M = 0.6, γ
G
M = 0.75, RB = 0.9, and θ = 0.5, (B.1) reduces to RG ≥ 1.157.
Substituting RG = 1.157 into (B.2) gives γ
G
M ≥ 0.745, which is satisfied by γGM = 0.75.
B. Hedge Funds
As discussed above, for hedge funds we set α = 0.1. We consider vL ∈ [0, 1/3, 2/3].
For hedge funds, our numerical exercise is substantially more challenging. It is easiest to
appreciate this by comparison to mutual funds. For mutual funds, since φ = 0, the exit
condition (B.3) is fully determined by (θ, A). This means that we could first check whether
a particular (θ, A) pair satisfies the exit condition. We could then check—via the guess
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with the (θ, A) that satisfy the interrelated conditions (B.1) and (B.2). When φ > 0, the








giving rise to a
six-dimensional numerical problem, which is further complicated by the fact that for each
candidate 6-tuple, we have to simultaneously check (i) whether ΠNIns > Π
I







< Πs or vice versa; and (iii) whether (B.1) and (B.2) are satisfied.
For this general case, it is challenging to depict the set of parameters for which hedge funds
would exit. To provide an easily interpretable depiction of our results, we first consider the
case in which γGM → 1. This radically simplifies matters because now it is immediate that
ΠNIns > Π
I
ns, since when γ
G
M → 1 the fund that observes a = 1 will conclude that she is bad,
and thus will not be tempted by the carry to invest in new opportunities at t = 1. Since ΠNIns
depends only on (θ, A) the six-dimensional search problem is reduced to a two-dimensional
one. In Figure 1 in Section VI, we plot the (θ, A) that give rise to exit. For γGM → 1 (B.2)
is automatically satisfied, and for each such (θ, A), it is easy to see that there exist RG that
satisfy (B.1).
However, we do not require that γGM → 1 to obtain reasonable parameters for hedge











ns, and (iii) (B.1) and (B.2)
are satisfied. We fix RB = γF = 0.8 throughout. The three examples are: (a) vL = 0,
A = 0.2, γGM = 0.95, γ
B
M = 0.2, θ = 0.3, and RG = 1.14; (b) vL = 1/3, A = 0.1,
θ = 0.3, γGM = 0.97, γ
B
M = 0.62, and RG = 1.141, and (c) vL = 2/3, A = 0.01, θ = 0.2,
γGM = 0.999, γ
B




ns, these examples are
consistent with Figure 1, and in each case the (θ, A) selected belongs to the shaded region
in the relevant panel of Figure 1. Further, note that the requirements on returns generated
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Notes
1Institutional money managers hold over 70% of U.S. equity (see, for example, Gillan and Starks (2007)),
and a significant measure of these holdings is quite concentrated. For example, Hawley and Williams (2007)
show that, in 2005, the 100 largest U.S. institutions owned 52% of publicly held equity. Gopalan (2008)
notes that in 2001 almost 60% of NYSE-listed firms had an institutional blockholder with at least 5% equity
ownership.
2See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1999) for mutual
funds, and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) and Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2013) for hedge funds.
3See, for example, Gopalan (2008), Bharat, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013), and Helwege, Intintoli, and
Zhang (2012).
4Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) estimate that the average equity ownership of officers and
directors in the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector was 17.4% in 1995.
5Needless to say, there may well be many reasons why mutual funds are not effective users of voice, such
as, for example, business ties with portfolio firms (see Davis and Kim (2007)).
6See, for example, Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner
(1994), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Tirole (2001), Noe (2002),
and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004).
7We build on Admati and Pfleiderer’s (2009) Model B. This is the version of the model in which they
show exit to be most effective as a governance mechanism. In other variants of their model, they show that
even when the blockholder is a principal, exit has potentially less desirable effects. We take as a starting
point the version of their model that gives exit its best chance as a governance mechanism and still show (see
Proposition 2 below) that agency frictions arising from the delegation of portfolio management can reduce
its effectiveness.
8We vary their model slightly by replacing stochastic agency costs by stochastic private benefits to man-
agers and by introducing a set of firms that are free of agency problems.
9We refer to funds and fund managers interchangeably throughout. In other words, we do not consider
potential incentive conflicts between funds and the managers they employ, focusing only on those between
funds and their investors.
10Note that Vt+1 is not necessarily identical to It+1 because, as the hiring and replacement process de-
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11Funds with little self-investment may be tempted to invest in new opportunities at t = 1 (even if the
expected return is negative) if they earn a convex carry, since they benefit from the upside (if the ex post
return is RG) without suffering from the downside (if the ex post return is RB).
12Proposition 2 requires that, fixing Θ\{γGM,RG}, γGM and RG are large. Since γBM, RB ∈ Θ\{γGM,RG},
this implies nontrivial ability differences across funds. This is sufficient but not necessary for performance-
chasing. For example, if γGM is only slightly greater than γ
B
M, investors would still prefer funds who have
not exited (and thus have generated higher t = 1 returns) and may re-allocate funds to better performers,
chasing performance. However, since γGM is close to γ
B
M, exit is not very informative about ability. Thus,
relative to the baseline, investors would be less keen (i) to fire their current fund if she exits (because now it
is no longer clear that the exiting fund generates a return dominated by the index asset) and (ii) to invest
in a new fund that has not exited (because exiting and non-exiting funds are not very different). Now, even
small transaction costs for switching funds may preclude performance chasing.
13Proposition 2 considers the case in which blockholders punish managers nonstochastically for choosing
a = 1. A careful reader may wonder whether there are equilibria in which the fund punishes the manager
with arbitrarily high probability for choosing a = 1. While threats involving mixed strategies are, in our
view, of limited applied relevance, we can show that even stochastic punishment fails without sufficient self-
investment. A formal result is stated and proved in the Internet Appendix, available in the online version of
this article on the Journal of Finance website.
14It is not difficult to obtain a back-of-the-envelope estimate of an upper bound on α implied by these
figures. According to the Investment Company Institute 2013 Factbook, there were 4,544 equity mutual
funds with total assets of $5215.26 billion, giving an average fund size of around $1.1 billion. Thus, the
Morningstar numbers suggest that for 88% of equity mutual funds α < 0.0009.
15Since we model competition for investor flow as a reputational cheap talk game, it is possible to sustain
many possible equilibria with arbitrarily chosen off-equilibrium beliefs. A full characterization of the equi-
librium set, even if it were feasible, would represent a digression and distract from the applied points we
wish to make. Instead, in Propositions 4 and 5 we characterize equilibria with the minimal and maximum
achievable amount of voluntary exit.
16From a theoretical standpoint, it would have been preferable to dispense with nonstrategic funds and
characterize the infimum of mixed equilibria with decreasing probabilities of exit. Unfortunately, it is chal-
lenging to characterize mixed equilibria in our model. The key reason is that a higher exit probability
has an ambiguous effect on prices: it lowers exit prices for informational reasons (exit is more likely to be
due to a = 1) but raises them for disciplinary reasons (higher firm value with more exit), introducing a
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17The nonmonotonicity in θ can be understood as follows: when θ → 0, the exit price at t = 1 becomes
fully revealing, weakening the incentives to exit.
18This formal model of voice can be reinterpreted as one in which the use of voice results in a decrease in
the manager’s private benefits from choosing a = 1.
19In particular, it is large enough to jointly satisfy the conditions for Proposition 4 (for  → 0) and
Proposition 5.
20Since any individual investor is infinitesimal, we assume that individual withdrawals generate no price
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Panel A. vH = 1, vL = 0







Panel B. vH = 1, vL = 1/3







Panel C. vH = 1, vL = 2/3
Figure 1: Parameters for which hedge funds use exit.
Panels A, B, and C depict (θ, A) constellations for which hedge funds use exit for different
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